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Abstract
Modern applications and Operating Systems vary greatly
with respect to how they register and identify different
types of content. These discrepancies lead to exploits
and inconsistencies in user experience. In this paper, we
highlight the issues arising in the modern content han-
dling ecosystem, and examine how the operating sys-
tem can be used to achieve unified and consistent content
identification.
1 Introduction
Data handling lies at the very heart of modern appli-
cations. The Operating System (OS), as well as the
applications running in user space, perform complex
tasks on a multitude of file types, applying different
security policies each time. File-associated metadata
such as the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
(MIMEs), the extended file attributes, or the filename
extension itself, provide indications about the type of
data being handled. However, applications are free to
perform their own processing of files at will, without
the interposition of the OS. This scheme, although
allowing for flexibility and specialized handling of
app-specific content, comes with a cost: as file parsing
logic is propagated, with variations, amongst similar
applications, bugs are introduced. Such bugs have been
exploited for over a decade, resulting in the execution of
active content without the users’ knowledge.
Current systems do not fully support unified handling
for different types of content. Instead, in the majority of
cases, applications are responsible for performing their
own processing or analysis on a particular file. This may
logically contradict analyses or processing performed
on the same file by the OS, or other applications. For
instance, it is possible that a given file may be treated as
an image by a particular application, but as a text file by
a different application running on the same machine [4].
More importantly, no mechanism exists between the OS
and the user space programs so that security policies
or assumptions for a particular file or file type can be
updated dynamically. For instance, despite the fact that a
PDF might be deemed malicious by a sophisticated PDF
reader and executed in a sandbox, this information is
not communicated to less sophisticated PDF readers that
may be installed in the same host, and might treat the
file in a different manner. If the file is not deleted by the
first PDF reader, it will continue to exist in the system,
and the OS will be unaware of the (malicious) char-
acteristics of the file. Moreover, although applications
often perform their own scanning or sniffing on a file’s
contents, ignoring the MIME or extension directives of
the OS, they do not communicate their different view of
the application to the OS.
As a result, the current content-handling ecosystem is
heavily fragmented, with different entities involved im-
plementing different policies. In this paper, we examine
the current status of the content handling practices and
how this can be exploited by attackers or degrade user ex-
perience. Drawing from the weaknesses of current sys-
tems, we introduce our recommendations on how the OS
can serve as a reference oracle concerning file properties.
In particular, we propose extending the existing
extended file attributes mechanism so that, whenever an
application has a different view of a file than the OS, this
new view is registered back to the host OS and communi-
cated to all the other applications handling the file. Thus,
any differences in MIME type identification amongst dif-
ferent applications, or between applications and the OS,
can be made known to the user. This simple addition to
file metadata does not impose backwards compatibility
limitations, but allows applications to act as cross-
reference oracles. Also, it enables the OS to detect any
changes in the properties of a file, and inform the user ac-
cordingly (e.g., the user will be able to receive a warning
every time non-active is about to be executed as active
or if active content is about to be flagged as non-active).
2 Motivating Example
Determining a file’s content is not trivial, especially in
cases of polyglots, where a file can have two different
content types (e.g., a GIF that may simultaneously be
a valid image and contain JavaScript). In this case, the
interpretation of the file might solely depend on the
context [6]. However, there are many cases in which
mis-interpretation of content does not match the user’s
expectations regarding the execution.
Figure 1: User’s system log leaked from an HTML file
executed with local permissions.
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An example of such scenario is presented in Figure 1:
Alice, a Mac OS X user, is tricked into clicking a link
that is supposed to contain a PDF attachment. However,
the website is malicious, and the attacker, instead of a
legitimate PDF, instead provides as attachment a ZIP file
that contains a Javascript executable script. The attacker
has removed the extension from the file, and has given
it an icon that matches the PDF icon for Alice’s OS.
Once Alice accesses the link with her Safari browser,
the ZIP file is extracted into the Downloads folder, with
all the attacker’s modifications on the icon and extension
preserved. Alice clicks on the PDF file, however, instead
of Mac OS X’s default PDF viewer rendering the PDF,
the malicious Javascript is executed in the browser with
localhost permissions. As a result, Alice’s sensitive
information such as her system logs leak to the attacker.
From the user’s perspective, this is clearly unwanted
behavior. This attack is still present in today’s Mac OS
X El Capitan, despite the fact that similar attacks have
appeared in the past (e.g., where a Javascript vulnera-
bility allowed loading of local files and browser-specific
privileged pages into an IFrame [1]). Regardless of the
exploitation scenario, Alice would perhaps have not
fallen for the clickjacking attack, had the OS enforced
stricter policies with respect to maching the icon and
extension of the file with the payload to be executed, or
had the OS prompt her with a warning message.
3 Background
3.1 The Content Handling Ecosystem
Data are seldom processed by a single application.
Instead, a file is usually accessed by multiple programs,
often running in different machines. In a typical sce-
nario, a payload is served from a server and then passes
through a series of intermediate entities on the Web (e.g.,
Ad networks, firewalls, proxies - to end up on the client
side (Fig. 2). Once data reaches the client application, it
might be stored on the disk, passed into the OS, or it can
be used as input for other applications.
OS
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Figure 2: Content lifecycle: arrows denote content-
identifying information exchange
Data type identification throughout this cycle is
primarily achieved through Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extension (MIME) types, which characterize the nature
of a particular payload. Public MIME types should be
registered with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA). IANA MIME types fall within nine major cat-
egories, namely: application, audio, font, image,
message, model, multipart, text and video [5].
Whenever a file is transferred from one entity to another,
the MIME type of the file is usually stored as part of the
metadata of the file, sent via request headers or, left to
be determined by the target entity from scratch. At the
end of this process, a file might be written to disk to be
processed in the future. Once a file is written on disk
and it is accessed by the user, the OS is responsible to
invoke the appropriate application for each file.
3.2 MIME handling by the OS
Operating Systems associate certain file extensions
with a set of MIME types, and, likewise, applications
register the MIME types they can handle back to the
host OS. Where and how this information gets stored
varies depending on the OS. 1 If a file has a known
extension the OS will open it with the default application
for the corresponding MIME type. In the case of an
extensionless file, the OS performs MIME-type sniffing
based on magic values present in the contents of the file.
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Figure 3: MIME types present in the default installation
of major OSes
Except for the public (registered) IANA MIME types,
OSes also support numerous "unofficial" MIME types,
which are used in the wild. Figure 3 shows the total
MIME types register with IANA, as well as in the
MIME types present in default install of Mac OS X El
Capitan, Windows 10 and Ubuntu 16.04 distributions,
per category. We notice that, in total, the three popular
1For instance, Ubuntu stores the mapping be-
tween file extensions and MIME types primarily in
/etc/mime.types, Mac OS X handles MIME associa-
tions via the LaunchServices sub-system, whilst in Windows
the respective mappings are stored in the system Registry in
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\MIME\Database\Content.
2
OSes support an additional Surprisingly, out of the
total unique 1261 unique MIME types in the three
popular OSes, 546 MIMEs, a staggering 43.29%, are
not registered with IANA. Moreover, we encountered
7 MIME types for El Capitan and 63 MIME types for
Ubuntu 16.04 that do not even fall within the nine major
IANA categories (such instances include MIME types
that fall within the chemical, inode, and x-conference
families). The fact that the above numbers originate
from vanilla systems, in which no third-party applica-
tions are installed, is indicative of the current status in
the MIME type ecosystem. Further discrepancies are
introduced if third-party applications are installed in the
system. As an example, let us consider the different
extensions that are handled by four major browsers in
Mac OS X El Capitan, presented in Fig. 4. We notice
that despite the fact that most extensions are handled by
at least three Browsers, there are cases (e.g., for filetypes
such as .mhtml, .webp, .mht) for which only two
of the four browsers are registered in the OS settings.
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Figure 4: Venn diagram of the number of extensions han-
dled by four popular browsers in Mac OS X El Capitan.
Such instances are indicative of the underlying dis-
crepancies between similar applications. However, with
regards to file type detection in particular, additional
complexities are introduced from the sniffing performed
both by the OS as well as the applications, which might
result in a misidentification of a file.
3.3 Handling Utrusted Content
Although the OS stores a hardcoded MIME mapping so
that different payloads can be processed by the appro-
priate applications, content transferred across Operating
Systems, applications or the Web may undergo several
stages of processing. Each of these stages might modify
the transferred content itself, or treat it as if it has a
different type (e.g., treat non-executable content as
executable and vice-versa). However, such assumptions
or modifications are not made known across all involved
entities. For instance, suppose that a .zip file is stored
on disk on server A and is being copied from server A
to server B with a MIME type of application/zip.
If the file is transferred from server B to an FTP server
C as of type application/x-zip, server C has no
way of knowing that the same file was transferred from
server A to B as application/zip.
Thus, applications processing untrusted files often
perform their own filtering, attempting to sniff the type
of each file they are handling. Moreover, on certain
OSes and configurations, whenever an application writes
a file on disk from an untrusted source such as the Web,
it informs the OS writing metadata in the files extended
file attributes.
Currently on Linux there are four namespaces for
extended file attributes, namely: user, trusted,
security and system. The system namespace is used
primarily by the kernel for access control lists (ACLs)
and can only be set by root. Whenever a file gets down-
loaded from the Internet, its origin URL is stored in the
dedicated extended attribute user.xdg.origin.url.
If there was a referrer URL present, the respective
attribute is also set in user.xdg.referrer.url. Win-
dows and OS X support similar attributes. For instance,
in OS X the com.apple.quarantine attribute is set
by quarantine-aware applications to inform users about
content that originated from the Web or an untrusted
source. If an application has the Info.plist key
LSFileQuarantineEnabled set, all files created by
that application will be quarantined by OS X. However,
although such attributes exist, not all OSes strictly
enforce properties associated with a particular file type.
Thus, it is possible for a file to have a PDF icon, without
being a valid PDF document. Such inconsistencies
have been used in clickjacking attacks [19], and are
still present. Finally, despite the extended file attributes
being present, they are underutilized, and are not used to
implement security policies to achieve extended access
control.
4 Observations on Current Content Handling
In this section we present some of the problems arising
from the current MIME handling ecosystem. Although
MIME-related attacks are known for more than a decade,
they are still present today [4, 7].
Observation 1: Reliable content identification at the
application level is hard: Relying on applications for
proper content identification is not scalable, as it is hard
for all applications responsible for handling a particular
file to behave exactly the same. To demonstrate the
difficulty of achieving a unified content policy enforce-
ment at the application level, we examine one of the
most prevalent and well-tested categories of software:
Web browsers. Whenever a browser attempts to identify
the type of a payload, the result depends on multiple
parameters. Examples of such parameters are:
• Payload: The real payload of the file being served.
• Extension: The file extension in the URL download
link or the file extension of the payload.
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Figure 5: Discrepancies in the MIME handling of the Opera and Firefox browsers.
• Content-type: The header sent by the server indicat-
ing the MIME type of the file being served. Again, this
may or may not match the real MIME type of the file.
• Content-Disposition: The header sent by the server
indicates whether the file should be downloaded or
rendered in the browser.
• X-Content-Type-Options: This header indicating
whether the browser should skip sniffing the contents
of the file.
Given the fact that there exist more than a thousand
MIME types [5], it is almost inevitable that differences
in browsers’ handling of content will continue to exist.
To demonstrate the extent of the discrepancies of modern
browser, we depict in Fig. 5 the key points in payload
identification over HTTP for the Opera and Firefox
browsers. The complexity of the schemes, and the dif-
ferences between only two browsers indicate that there is
high probability where a user will encounter unexpected
behavior, if the payloads are crafted properly. Web
browsers are perhaps amongst the most complex pieces
of software, and browser developers often "peek" into
the implementations of other vendors to determine what
functionality they should support. Representative of the
current developer workflow is the following comment,
extracted from Chromium’s mime_util.cc, regarding
MIME type identification:
“We implement the same algorithm as Mozilla for
mapping a file extension to a mime type. That is, we first
check a hard-coded list (that cannot be overridden), and
then if not found there, we defer to the system registry.
Finally, we scan a secondary hard-coded list to catch
types that we can deduce but that we also want to allow
the OS to override."
Unfortunately, discrepancies between different ven-
dors are omnipresent: many such cases have been
encountered in browser’s differences in CSS and
Javascript handling. With the constant adoption of
new features, such discrepancies are prone to lead
to attacks [2, 22, 25, 29]. Not adopting a centralized
scheme, not only degrades user experience with users
seeing different behavior when accessing the same
resources or websites from a different browsers, but,
more importantly, leaves users vulnerable.
Observation 2: Application-level content identifi-
cation is risky: There have been multiple instances in
the wild, where inactive content has been misclassified
as active and vice-versa. Such cases include input
sanitization bypasses of web-forms [9, 17, 18, 26, 30],
or unwanted execution [4, 7]. Often exploitation is
achieved due to poor sanitization on the application
side, accepting files with fake file extensions [3], double
extensions [10–15] or no extensions at all. Although
old, this technique is still used today [4]. Most of these
exploitation instances however, would have been easily
detected had the OS provided a richer and reliable con-
tent identification interface to the applications, so that the
latter could delegated this task to the Operating System.
Several clickjacking attacks abuse current content
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handling mechanisms. For instance, Unicode character
tricks have been used so that victims think that a file
has an expected, legal extension, whereas no extension
is present [27]. When executed, the file will be opened
according to the MIME-sniffing properties of the host
OS. Similar problems arise when users associate a
particular icon with its legal file type while the host OS
allows for an arbitrary icon assignment for each file.
Even in modern OSes like the OS X, it is possible for a
file to have an icon associated with a different filetype,
as we showed in our motivating example.
5 Recommendations for OS-based Content Policies
Except for instances of privilege escalation attacks
within the realm of a single application [16], exploita-
tion of MIME handling weaknesses often achieves
unwanted execution across applications. For instance,
the auto-open browser feature has been exploited in the
past to achieve unwanted execution [8]. Alternatively,
attackers who are aware of the fact that browsers follow
different sandboxing policies when executing local ver-
sus remote JavaScript, might attempt to force a browser
to download a malicious payload and store it on disk, so
that it executes in a non-sandboxed environment when
accessed, as was the case in our motivating example.
In the aforementioned scenarios, a discrepancy exists
between either the view of different applications on a file,
or between applications and the OS. Another common
characteristic is the lack of interfaces for communicating
content-related attributes between applications as well as
between applications and the OS. This allows for a class
of attacks in which the attacker “disguises" a payload and
presents it to the appropriate application as of a different
type, so that it executes under different security policies.
Since applications often invoke other applications di-
rectly to process a particular payload, it is necessary that
they get all the possible information they could use with
regards to content identification. More importantly, any
different view an application might have for a particular
file should be communicated back to the OS, so that
the user can be warned accordingly. In summary, it is
important that the following properties are maintained:
• Each payload should be identified uniquely by all ap-
plications in the same OS. This uniform identification
should also reflect in the respective properties of the
payload such as the file extension (if any), or the icon
which is associated with that payload type: All PDFs
of a given type, should have a single icon in the sys-
tem and share the same extension. Any discrepancies
found should be reported to the user.
• Active content should be explicitly flagged based on
its type, in a centralized manner. Applications should
let the OS know what types of content they consider
active and file properties should be updated dynami-
cally if a discrepancy is detected.
• If a user trusts a file once, this should be made known
across all applications. Reversely, if an application
detects some inconsistency in the type of a file that
the user trusts, this should be made known to the user
(e.g., the user thinks this file is inactive but in reality it
contains active content).
We believe that current extended file attribute mech-
anism can be expanded to provide support for the above
properties. Paired with an interface for applications to
update this metadata dynamically, such a design can
serve as the basis for applying fine-grained access con-
trol at a file level. For instance, applications may register
the set of third-party executables that are allowed to be
invoked when processing a particular file.
6 Related Work
Throughout Section 4, we refered to multiple at-
tacks [4, 7] exploiting the current content handling
ecosystem. Except for the aforementioned examples,
multiple XSS techniques have appeared in the literature,
exploiting either application flaws, discrepancies or
content mishandling [20, 23, 28]. A related technique
proposed by Heiderich et al. [24] is based on Scalable
Vector Graphics (SVG). Specifically, the authors have
illustrated that SVG images embedded via <img> tag
and CSS can execute arbitrary JavaScript code.
Similar attacks utilize savvy vectors to inject
JavaScript in the web user’s browsers include Cross-
channel Scripting (XCS) [21] attacks. In an XCS attack,
the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
can be used as an attack vector. For instance, there are
several Network-Attached Storage (NAS) devices that
let web users upload files via the Server Message Block
(SMB) protocol. An attacker could upload a file with a
name that contains a malicious script. When a benign
user connects over to the device to browse its contents,
the device will send through an HTTP response the list
of all filenames, including the malicious one. Hence, the
script that exists in this file is going to be interpreted as
legitimate by the browser.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we highlighted a number of problems
arising from the currently fragmented content handling
ecosystem and possible directions that can be taken
by the OS towards resolving these issues. Content
identification should not be hard. We hope that our
paper will encourage OS designers to revisit currently
deployed schemes and take steps to enable unified,
cross-application content policies.
References
[1] 920515 - (cve-2013-5598) pdf.js iframe injection allows sites to
load local files or even chrome privileged pages into an iframe.
5
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?
id=920515.
[2] Capec - capec-209: Cross-site scripting using mime type
mismatch (version 2.9). https://capec.mitre.org/da
ta/definitions/209.html.
[3] How hackers can disguise malicious programs with fake file
extensions. http://www.howtogeek.com/127154/how
-hackers-can-disguise-malicious-programs-w
ith-fake-file-extensions/.
[4] Imagemagick 6.9.3-9 / 7.0.1-0 - multiple vulnerabilities (image-
tragick). https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/
39767/.
[5] Media types. http://www.iana.org/assignments/m
edia-types/media-types.xhtml.
[6] Mitigating mime confusion attacks in firefox | mozilla security
blog. https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2016
/08/26/mitigating-mime-confusion-attacks-i
n-firefox/.
[7] Reliably compromising ubuntu desktops by attacking the crash
reporter | donncha o’cearbhaill. https://donncha.is/201
6/12/compromising-ubuntu-desktop/.
[8] Safari web browser auto executes shell scripts; disable ’open
’safe’ files after downloading’ option - macdailynews - welcome
home. http://macdailynews.com/2006/02/21/ap
ples_safari_web_browser_automatically_exec
utes_shell_scripts/.
[9] CVE-2003-0130, March 2003.
[10] CVE-2006-2743, May 2006.
[11] CVE-2006-3102, June 2006.
[12] CVE-2006-3103, June 2006.
[13] CVE-2006-3104, June 2006.
[14] CVE-2006-3105, June 2006.
[15] CVE-2006-4558, May 2006.
[16] CVE-2006-7234, November 2006.
[17] CVE-2008-3823, September 2008.
[18] CVE-2008-6840, July 2008.
[19] M. Balduzzi, M. Egele, E. Kirda, D. Balzarotti, and C. Kruegel.
A solution for the automated detection of clickjacking attacks.
In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security, ASIACCS ’10, pages
135–144, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[20] A. Barth, J. Caballero, and D. Song. Secure content sniffing for
web browsers, or how to stop papers from reviewing themselves.
In Security and Privacy, 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on, pages
360–371. IEEE, 2009.
[21] H. Bojinov, E. Bursztein, and D. Boneh. Xcs: Cross channel
scripting and its impact on web applications. In Proceedings of the
16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity, CCS ’09, pages 420–431, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[22] M. Heiderich, T. Frosch, M. Jensen, and T. Holz. Crouching tiger
- hidden payload: Security risks of scalable vectors graphics.
In Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, CCS ’11, pages 239–250, New York,
NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
[23] M. Heiderich, J. Schwenk, T. Frosch, J. Magazinius, and E. Z.
Yang. mxss attacks: Attacking well-secured web-applications
by using innerhtml mutations. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer &#38; Communications Secu-
rity, CCS ’13, pages 777–788, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
[24] J. Magazinius, B. K. Rios, and A. Sabelfeld. Polyglots: Crossing
origins by crossing formats. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer &#38; Communications Secu-
rity, CCS ’13, pages 753–764, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
[25] K. Makan. Stealing secrets with css : Cross origin css attacks.
http://blog.k3170makan.com/2016/02/stealing
-secrets-with-css-cross-origin.html, February
2016.
[26] A. Monachos. Mimesweeper for smtp - multiple cross-site
scripting vulnerabilities. https://www.exploit-db.com
/exploits/38318/, 2 2013.
[27] P. Security. Right to left override unicode can be used for multiple
spoofing cases. https://dl.packetstormsecurity.n
et/papers/general/righttoleften-override.p
df.
[28] B. Stock, S. Lekies, T. Mueller, P. Spiegel, and M. Johns. Precise
client-side protection against dom-based cross-site scripting.
In Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Conference on Security
Symposium, SEC’14, pages 655–670, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2014.
USENIX Association.
[29] B. Stock, S. Pfistner, B. Kaiser, S. Lekies, and M. Johns. From
facepalm to brain bender: Exploring client-side cross-site
scripting. In Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’15, pages
1419–1430, New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
[30] Xacker. Invision power board 3.0.3 - ’.txt’ mime-type cross-site
scripting. https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/
33394/.
6
